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Abstract
In the past two decades, organizational scholars have focused significant attention on how organizations
manage crises. While most of these studies concentrate on crisis prevention, there is a growing emphasis on
crisis response. Because information that is critical to crisis response may become outdated as crisis conditions
change, crisis response research recognizes that the management of information flows and networks is critical
to crisis response. Yet despite its importance, little is known about the various types of crisis information networks
and the role of IT in enabling these information networks. Employing concepts from information flow and social
network theories, this paper contributes to crisis management research by developing four crisis response
information network prototypes. These networks are based on two main dimensions: (1) information flow
intensity and (2) network density. We describe how considerations of these two dimensions with supporting case
evidence yield four prototypical crisis information response networks: Information Star, Information Pyramid,
Information Forest, and Information Black-out. In addition, we examine the role of IT within each information
network structure. We conclude with guidelines for managers to deploy appropriate information networks
during crisis response and with suggestions for future research related to IT and crisis management.
Keywords: Crisis Response, Information Networks, Role of IT, Information Flow, Network Density.
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Crisis Response Information Networks
1. Introduction
The occurrence of several large-scale natural disasters in the past two decades -- e.g., the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome pandemic, Hurricane Katrina, Asian Tsunami disasters and the Swine
Flu epidemic -- has attracted significant public attention and ignited interest among researchers
(Thomas & Fritz, 2006; Weick, 1993; Lin, Zhao, Ismail, & Carley, 2006; Junglas & Ives, 2007;
Majchrzak, Jarvenpaa, & Hollingshead, 2007; Billings, Milburn, & Schaalman, 1980; Van de Walle,
Van Den Eede, & Muhren, 2009; Mitroff, Pauchant, Finney, & Pearson, 1989; Quarantelli, 2001;
Rubin, Amlôt, Page, & Wessely, 2009). While extensive work has focused on preventing crises under
the assumption that crises are avoidable (Augustine, 1995; Kash & Darling, 1998; Salmon, 1993), the
recognition that poor crisis response can result in a humanitarian catastrophe of far larger magnitude
than the damage caused by the original event itself (Junglas & Ives, 2007; Hynes & Prasad, 1997) is
leading to a growing body of research emphasizing crisis response (Leidner, Pan, & Pan, 2009; Hiltz,
Van de Walle, & Turoff, 2010).
One element of crisis response that is particularly important to large-scale disasters is that of
information flow and network management (Housel, El Sawy, & Donovan, 1986). Managing information
flows is critical in crisis situations because decision making is bounded by time urgency, and information
may become outdated as the crisis conditions change (Majchrzak et al., 2007; Hale, 1997).
Furthermore, decision makers face the challenges of information overload; the availability of fewer
communication channels; and the omitting, delaying, and filtering of information, and processing of
incorrect information during crises by intermediate message-handling units (Nunamaker, Weber, &
Chen, 1989; Sniezek, Wilkins, Wadlington, & Baumann, 2002). To cope with crises in an efficient and
highly coordinated manner, updated crisis information must be allowed to flow vertically and horizontally
among crisis response organizations in a rapid manner (Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005).
The aim of this paper is to analyze the different approaches to structuring information networks during
crisis response and to investigate the role of IT in these information networks. Drawing upon concepts
from information flow and network theory, we use a comparative case study of the responses to four
major societal crises to develop four prototypical crisis information response networks. The two main
dimensions of our framework are (1) information flow intensity and (2) network density. Our
prototypical networks provide a basis for further research into IT and crisis response and allow
practitioners to understand the development and use context of the information networks they
implement during crisis response.
Our paper is organized as follows: we begin with a review of information flow and network research.
We then present our research method and cases. We conduct within-case and cross-case analyses.
Our implication focuses on the role of IT in crisis response information networks. Finally, we present
some research and practical implications.

2. Theoretical Foundation: Information Flow and Information
Networks
Information flow is an important topic in several streams of organizational research, including
organization design (Te’eni, 2001), supply chains (Sahin & Robinson, 2002), and social networks. The
latter stream of work is particularly relevant to crisis response situations because responding agencies
are often not a single organization but multiple organizations with varying degrees of pre-existing
relationships. The network of responding agencies must be quickly assembled and coordinated. Social
network research distinguishes networks according to the type and level of ties (i.e., individual,
organizational, and institutional) comprising the network (Bell & Zaheer, 2007; Suarez, 2005). Existing
ties, be they individual, organizational, or institutional, imply a well-established, trust-based relationship
(Krovi, Chandra, & Rajagopalan, 2003; Pan & Pan, 2006). The strength of the ties depends on several
factors such as the amount of time spent together, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, the reciprocal
services associated with the relationship (Granovetter, 1973), the sense of belonging, and the
perception of the actor’s role importance (Hahn, Moon, & Zhang, 2008; Pan & Pan, 2011). The diffusion
of information – e.g., information flow -- is influenced by network ties. The degree to which network ties
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influence the information flow depends on whether the ties are strong or weak. Strong ties are likely to
promote high quality information transfer between parties and serve as effective conduits of information
(Rowley, Behrens, & Krackhardt, 2000; Adler, Goldoftas, & Levine, 1999), especially among formalized
networks (Ghoshal, Korine, & Szulanski, 1994; Granovetter, 1973; Levin & Cross, 2004; Pan, Pan,
Chen, & Hsieh, 2007; Tan, Pan, & Hackney, 2010). Weak ties, however, may provide access to
information only in outer social circles but may provide a large amount of information (Granovetter,
1973). Generally in an organizational setting, it is important to establish strong ties among actors in
order to enhance team performance (Gruenfeld, Mannix, Williams, & Neale, 1996) and to establish
weak ties in order to promote innovation (Gilsing & Nooteboom, 2005).
In a crisis situation, there is no time for the time-consuming process of developing and nurturing close
ties; rather, responders must draw upon their existing ties but also quickly establish new ties. The ties
are part of a complex network of responders. For example, in a typical response to a hurricane in the
state of Florida, more than 300 responders from 50 different agencies will be activated, each with
different specialized expertise (Xia, Becerra-Fernandez, Gudi, & Rocha, 2011). Given the large
number of responders and agencies involved, the structural complexity of the response network is
very high (Xia et al., 2011). Consequently, one essential element concerning information flow in crisis
response is the design of a structure of information flow among agencies that ensures proper flow of
information to and from the relevant agencies. We refer to this structure of information flow in crisis
response as the crisis response network.
Among the key activities of the crisis response network is to ensure that resources are effectively and
efficiently allocated to the affected individuals. In order to properly collect and allocate resources,
responders require detailed ground information, detailed information about available resources, and
detailed logistics information, as well as information about where responders are located and their
access to resources. It is the responsibility of the central responding agency – the agency that
oversees the coordination of all other responding agencies – to establish the protocols for collecting,
storing, sharing, and distributing information (Pan, Pan & Devadoss, 2005). Traditionally, disaster
planners and managers have advocated top-down, centralized command and control during
emergency situations (Moynihan, 2008; Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997). However, some have argued
that the centralized command and control may not be a good model (Lin et al., 2006). Because the
detailed information must move at a rapid pace and across a variety of sources, existing information
channels and routines are often too slow, disconnected, and inadequate to meet the needs of crisis
information flow (Majchrzak et al., 2007). As a result, other forms of crisis response networks may
need to be considered in order to improve information flow.
Recent work on information flow in crisis response has focused on the impediments to information
flow (Day, Junglas, & Silva, 2009), identifying seven major impediments to the flow of information
across a crisis response supply chain network. The seven impediments are data inaccessibility, data
inconsistency, inadequate stream of information, low information priority, source identification
difficulty, storage media misalignment, and unreliability (Day et. al., 2009). Technology may play a role
in overcoming the impediments to information flow. Pivotal in supporting information processing and
disseminating activities during crisis response are emergency management information systems
(Hiltz et al., 2010) or crisis information systems. To be effective, crisis information systems ought to
consider who the participants are, what they aim to achieve, and what the relationships are among
them (Jul, 2010; Quarantelli, 2005). Emergency management information systems play an active role
in simplifying data and minimizing filtering, supporting feature matching, reducing cognitive overload,
directing attention efficiently, reducing confirmation bias, and aiding diagnosis during crisis response
(McKinney, 2008; Turoff, Van de Walle, & Hiltz, 2009).
Most of the work on IT in crisis response has focused on the role of IT in coordinating information flow
across responders (Leidner et al., 2009; Manoj & Baker, 2007). Less, if any, attention has been paid
to the processes of communicating with victims and with the public. Because of the large number of
potential stakeholders involved, a primary challenge in crisis response is the process of stakeholder
informing (Leidner et al., 2009; Majchrzak et al., 2007). Indeed, the process of resolute informing is a
central activity that involves creating new, or modifying existing, communication and information
channels to ensure the timeliness of information delivery from multiple sources (U.S. National
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Research Council, 2005), the avoidance of information overload (Turoff, Chumer, Walle, & Yao,
2004), and the establishment of accountability with fragmented information across stakeholder groups
(Leidner et al., 2009; Marcus & Nichols, 1999; Chen, Sharman, Rao, Upadhyaya, & Cook-Cottone,
2010). Recent work suggests that the public sometimes develops its own informing process during
crises, when it is unable to get what it deems as reliable, timely information from the central
responding agencies (Day et al., 2009).
The above review of the literature on information flow during crisis response suggests that information
flow is an essential element of crisis response and that the effectiveness of the crisis response network
will be influenced by the role of the central responding agency, the role of IT in helping coordinate the
diverse agencies involved, and the means of communication with stakeholders. Yet the literature is not
specific on the different types of crisis response networks or how the network type influences information
flow. Our study addresses these issues. Using case studies of the information processes developed
during the crisis response activities following four independent crises, our study will uncover different
structures of information networks that result in varying degrees and intensity of information flow.

3. Research Approach
We adopted a qualitative research approach with a multiple case design in order to ensure exposure
to different forms of crisis information networks. The selection of the cases was guided by the
principle of theoretical replication (Yin, 1994). We selected and successfully obtained access to two
case sites and carried out extensive primary data collection. Given the limited access to more crisis
response case sites, we turned to secondary data collection. We selected cases in extreme situations
and polar types in which the process of information flow is “transparently observable” (Pettigrew,
1988). Each of the four cases was contextualized in a large-scale natural disaster setting. The
organizations involved in this study were comprised of mostly public-sector organizations with only
one being a private, non-profit organization. While all of these cases have similar characteristics to
some extent in that they were large-scale natural disasters requiring the involvement of local,
regional, and national aid organizations, we sought variation in other characteristics to tease out
further compelling evidence. For example, the approaches to crisis response and information
management were different across the four cases. Our goal was to expand and generalize theories
(analytical generalization) rather than to engage in statistical generalization (Yin, 1994; Myers &
Newman, 2007; Pan & Tan, 2011). The four cases we studied were: the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) crisis in Singapore, the Sri Lanka tsunami crisis, the Cyclone Nargis crisis in
Burma, and the Hurricane Katrina crisis in the US. The unit of analysis is “network.” The four different
networks represented in the four cases are summarized in Table 1 below.
Table 1. A Summary of Four Crisis Response Networks
Data
Collection

Information
Flow

Primary

High intensity
and density

Primary

High intensity,
low density

Secondary

Low intensity,
high density

Secondary

Low intensity,
low density

Name of
Crisis
Severe Acute
Respiratory
Syndrome
Crisis

Crisis Response Organizations Involved
Network

Singapore’s Defence
Science Technology
Agency, Ministry of
Health and 12 other
Government agencies
Sri Lanka
Tzu Chi Voluntary Tzu Chi Taiwan,
Tsunami
Organization,
Malaysia and Host
Disaster
Taiwan and its
Countries’ Voluntary
Overseas
Organizations
Branches
Cyclone Nagis Government of
Burmese Government,
Crisis
Burma &
Red Cross Organization,
International
and Several Others
Relief
Organizations
Hurricane
US Government City, State of Louisiana
Katrina Crisis Agencies
and US Federal
Government
Singapore
Government
Agencies

Date of Crisis
Occurrence
March, 2003

December, 2004

May, 2008

August, 2005
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3.1. Data Collection
Of the four cases analyzed, we conducted primary data collection in two cases and secondary data
collection in the other two. For the case of the SARS crisis, field research began in August 2005 at
one of the working groups participating in the SARS crisis response, Singapore’s Defence Science
Technology Agency (DSTA). Altogether, we conducted 16 interviews of senior managers and
members of the crisis response team. For the Sri Lankan tsunami crisis, we interviewed key members
from Tzu Chi Voluntary Organization (Tzu Chi), a Taiwanese not-for-profit organization that
participated in the Sri Lanka tsunami disaster relief mission. Altogether, we conducted 18 face-to-face
interviews between April 2005 and January 2006. The interviewees selected for both cases
comprised mainly the key members of the crisis response teams. The interviews lasted approximately
one to one and a half hours each. Crisis management, information flow, and social network theories
guided the design of the interview questions.
These interviewees represent various “voices” (Myers & Newman, 2007). Gathering different
perspectives is important for triangulation purpose (Rubin & Rubin, 2005) and to prevent elite bias
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). For both cases, the interviews included a variety of questions concerning
how crisis information flow was managed during the dire period and the factors that affected the way
information was disseminated. We inquired about how updated information was published publicly
and the amount of information organizations were collecting and transmitting during the response
period. The interviews also included more general questions designed to give interviewees the
chance to express their opinions on the crisis response experience (refer to Appendix A for excerpts
of interview topic guides). All interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. Summaries were
generated from the transcribed texts.
For the cases of Cyclone Nagis and Hurricane Katrina, we used secondary documentation from a
variety of sources as the text to be examined (i.e., major periodicals and information from several
governmental and private, not-for-profit organizations’ websites that emerged after the disaster
events). We were inspired by several previous studies that deemed secondary data effective and
useful in explaining vulnerable and sensitive settings (Cowton, 1998; Davidson, Worrell, & Lee, 1994;
Barley, Meyer, & Gash, 1988; Church, 2002). Altogether, we identified and studied 37 articles. Refer
to appendices B and C for the reference details of some of these articles. We focused our data
collection on articles reporting the relief activities carried out by major crisis responders (e.g., Federal
Emergency Management Agency; US Department of Health and Human Services; Asean
Humanitarian Relief Efforts for Victims of Cyclone Nagis) and other media reports on the two crises
(e.g., New York Times; CNN; The Guardian). Media reports and analyses pertaining to responses to
both disasters were deemed relevant to our data gathering efforts as they represent a “faithful mirror
of reality” (Franzosi, 1995, p. 166). We first identified articles with titles or keywords that included
Cyclone Nagis or Hurricane Katrina. After reading the relevant articles, we highlighted the sentences
that described the crisis response actions, and the topics that emerged included: what were the
response strategies and plans, what actions were taken, and who was involved. On several
occasions, we revisited articles we had analyzed previously and provided linkages to other articles if
they provided similar reports or analyses (Harris, 2001; Insch, Moore, & Murphy, 1997).

3.2. Data Analysis
We carried out data analysis by recursively iterating between the empirical data, the theoretical lens,
and the relevant crisis management literature. The iteration helped to shape our four emerging
prototypical crisis response information networks. We continued the iterative process until the state of
theoretical saturation was reached, that is, when it was possible to comprehensively explain the
findings of the case study, and no additional data needed to be collected or added to improve the
developed prototypes (Eisenhardt, 1989). We began our analysis by reading all transcripts and
documents and highlighting the descriptions that were related to the crisis information flow
management process. Social network theory sensitized us to the importance of information flow but
stopped short of indicating the precise characteristics of flow that might be relevant to code.
Therefore, we used analytic induction (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998) to uncover new constructs and
relationships that could enrich our understanding of the phenomenon and assist our theory building
process (Patton, 2002). Analytical induction involved the following steps (Goetz & LeCompte, 1981):
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(1) defining phenomenon in a tentative manner, (2) scanning data to identify categories, (3)
developing typologies, (4) determining the relationships that exist among categories, and (5)
continually refining categories until all are accounted for. Table 2 below summarizes the analytic
induction procedures adopted in this study.
Table 2. A Summary of the Analytic Induction Procedures Adopted in this Study
Steps of Analytic Induction

Additional Description

Illustration (where applicable)

1 Defining a phenomenon in a Formulating provisional
tentative manner
statements about the
phenomenon

2

3

4

5

Our review of the literature on information flow
during crisis response informed the
importance of information flow during crisis
response and that the effectiveness of the
crisis response network will be influenced by
several attributes. The literature review
provided the tentative theoretical foundation of
the phenomenon
Scanning data to identify
Creating descriptive codes
We conducted line-by-line coding that helped
categories
that require little or no
us to focus on the content of the text in the
inference beyond the data
line and allowed us to develop our coding
itself (Miles & Huberman,
categories: information flow and direction, and
1994)
network density
Developing typologies
Creating inferential codes that We analyzed the coding categories in each
pull together data into smaller case and subsequently compared them
and more meaningful units
across the four cases. The analysis led us to
(Punch, 2005)
derive four crisis network response
information structures
Determining the
Developing theory or
We studied the relationships among the
relationships that exist
statement that helps in
categories and found that the four information
among categories
understanding the
network types vary in the amount of
phenomenon by determining information the network is able to process
the relationships among the
(information intensity), the direction of the flow
categories
of the information (top-down vs bottom-up),
the overall reach of the information (density),
and in the role of the central organizational
response agency (refer to Table 5)
Continually refining
Data continue to support and Our iterative process continued until it was
categories and roles until all substantiate the emerging
possible to comprehensively explain the four
are accounted for
categories (Holton, 2007)
information networks and their structures, and
no additional data needed to be collected or
added to improve the developed prototypes

To establish the patterns of information flows among the crisis response organizations, we first listed
the types of information relevant to the crisis response process (refer to Table 3).
Table 3. Types of Crisis Response Information
Information Element
Personnel Status
Infrastructure

Crisis Management and
Notification
Area Access

Crisis Information Content
Registration of personnel, exact location of personnel, and personnel tracking
system. Personnel with first aid and fire rescue experiences
Location of emergency aid equipment. Details of crisis management system
specifications, e.g., hardware and software. Established physical communication
networks such as telephone and radio
Emergency plans and organization, emergency preparedness practices, and
existence of test scenarios. Communications within rescue organizations, such as
report lines between rescue leader, assistants, rescue personnel, press, and public
administration
Geographical information such as infrastructure, one-way streets, blocked access
routes, road barriers, parking, and helicopter landing areas
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We then developed a list of common themes including information flow speed and network density,
which dealt with information handling during the crisis response, and two more general categories
involving stakeholders and resources (Refer to Table 4 below). Speed and volume of information were
two prominent components of information handling, which we label information intensity. A second
information-handling category concerns the direction of information flow. Here we looked for evidence
of information flowing top-down or bottom-up. Based upon the data, we added an unexpected flow, in
silo, to reflect response networks where information flowed around silos but not across silos. Another
theme we found repeatedly was network density -- the concentration of nodes in the crisis response
network. We looked for evidence that indicated the concentration of organizations.
Table 4. Excerpts of Coding Categories
Sample Code
Category

Category

Description

Stakeholders

Variety of
stakeholders
involved and
affected by crisis
response

Main responsibility
Authority
Hierarchical level

Resources

Resources
deployed during
crisis response

Information
Flow Intensity

Speed and volume
of information
diffusion during
crisis response

Manpower
Funding
Equipments and
vehicles
IT expertise
Availability of IT
infrastructure and
applications
Immediate
Delayed
Volume
Frequency

Network
Density

Number of
intermediate nodes
in the information
processing channel
The predominant
transportation
mode for
information

Direction of
Information
Flow

Information
intermediaries
Sources and
destinations
Top-down
Bottom-up
In silos

Excerpts of Transcripts
(a) “a nine-member inter-ministry SARS task force
was set up with the Home Affairs Minister leading
the crisis response operation”
(b) “many foreign aid organizations were made to
wait anxiously for approval from the Burmese
Government to deliver loads of emergency
supplies to the cyclone victims”
(a) “DSTA developed a crisis management system”
(b) “Tzu Chi mobilizes and coordinates volunteers
arriving from the Taiwan Headquarters, the host
countries, and from the neighboring countries”
(c) “Humanitarian organizations became wary of
handing over millions of dollars' worth of food and
equipment to the military government”
(a) “the Health Minister of Singapore would provide
daily updates of SARS outbreak”
(b) “Tzu Chi relief teams would receive instructions
and updates of the response progress twice a
day”
(c) “Large information had to be drawn from
hospitals, Ministry of Health, clinics and traditional
Chinese medicine practitioners”
(d) “the Burmese Government banned information
concerning the crisis response situations”
(a) “The SARS command center deployed 14
ministries and statutory boards to combat the
national crisis”
(a) “Throughout the entire saga, the Junta leaders
kept information flow to foreign aid organizations
to a minimum”
(b) “Bureaucracy slowed the entire relief action and
initiative. For example FEMA being part of the
Department of Homeland Security became a layer
down the hierarchy. All these layers further
delayed clear crisis response messages being
sent out early”

Coding categories reflect our interpretations of the information flow management process during crisis
response. We conducted an initial pilot run for coder training and pilot testing of reliability. During the
pilot run, we also refined the coding instrument and procedures. To establish the reliability of the
coding, each coder was asked to quote a particular segment of the relevant texts. Coding was
conducted independently and without consultation and guidance. We examined the portions of the
codings where both coders agreed and measured the inter-coder reliability using Cohen’s Kappa
37
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coefficient. Our coefficient score of 0.77 suggests substantial agreement between the two coders, and
the result also demonstrates that the categories were clearly defined and could be located in the text
with little ambiguity. As the reliability coefficient was high, each coder was subsequently asked to
code separate portions of the texts. We sorted relevant interview comments and secondary reports
according to the various categories and developed a list of themes within each category (Harris,
2001). The list contained the location of each comment on the transcript, the transcript number, the
interview date, any links to other comments, reports, and sources of news coverage. In addition, we
looked for evidence in the transcripts that indicated the relativity of our two dimensions. The next step
in our analysis was to analyze the information flow and direction, network density, stakeholders, and
resources in each case and, subsequently, compare across the four cases. This led us to derive four
crisis network response information structures (described in the Within-Case and Cross-Case
Analysis Sections). In order to reduce researcher bias, a senior colleague was asked to take part in
early analysis of some of the data. The colleague was uninvolved in the fieldwork and was, therefore,
unfamiliar with all four cases. The role of this colleague was to bring a different and possibly more
objective eye to the evidence and detect any bias in data analysis.
Overall, our findings revealed patterns that conformed to the information flow, network, and crisis
management literature in that the importance of information flow activities was underscored in each
case, with two providing examples of effective information flow and two providing examples of
ineffective information flow. But our findings go beyond the existing work by uncovering four crisis
information network approaches that had yet to be explored in existing crisis management literature.
The next section presents the background information of the four cases, describes the events that
happened, and analyzes how information flows and networks were managed during respective crisis
response operations.

4. Case Description and Analysis
4.1. Within-Case Analysis
For each case, we explain the center of the crisis response operations – its major activities as well as
how it was organized, the technologies used in support of the center of operations, and the nature of
communications with stakeholders. These three categories of analysis, derived from our review of the
literature, enable us to understand what information was gathered by whom (e.g., the activities and
structure of the center of operations), how the information was gathered and disseminated (the
technology in support of the center), and with whom the information was shared (the communication
between the center and stakeholders).

4.2. Case 1: SARS Crisis – Singapore Government
The SARS outbreak in March, 2003 was a national health crisis in Singapore. Within two days of
being notified of the first several cases of the virus, a nine-member inter-ministry SARS task force
was established to coordinate the crisis response operation. The Minister explained the crisis
response strategy: “Our national strategy against SARS has three prongs: First, to detect and isolate
SARS cases as early as possible. Second, to ring-fence detected or suspected cases, hospitals and
clinics and personnel treating SARS cases and adopt robust screening and infection control
procedures. Third, to contain the spread of the virus and guard vigilantly against outbreak in the wider
community.” Initially, the Ministry of Health used an ad-hoc spreadsheet to maintain a list of infected
patients and potential contacts that were required for medical confinement. Within two weeks, a crisis
management system was developed to process and distribute information necessary to coordinate
various crisis response activities across some 14 government agencies. The information included
hospital contact tracing, daily SARS updates, border control, community contact tracing, and the
issuance and supervision of home quarantine orders. To develop the case database, information had
to be drawn from hospitals, the Ministry of Health, clinics, and traditional Chinese medicine
practitioners. The isolation, preventive, and containment measures the government implemented
proved highly effective. Although SARS spread rapidly and there was little medical knowledge
available on how to treat it, Singapore experienced only 238 cases. Within three months of its first
reported cases, Singapore was removed from WHO's list of SARS-affected countries.
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4.2.1. Center of Crisis Operations
In responding to SARS, the Singaporean government set up a SARS command center under the
direction of the Home Affairs minister supported by 14 government ministries. Various government
agencies focused on specific informing issues. For example, the Ministry of Health monitored the
spread of SARS and the movements of individuals who had been exposed to SARS. The Ministry of
Finance provided the information on Central Provident Fund contributors, which accounts for virtually
everyone in the Singapore workforce, thereby enabling individuals to be traced from that single
database. The Ministry of National Development conducted a survey to assess the level of public
confidence in fighting SARS. The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore issued directives to airlines and
ensured compliance with SARS preventive measures at the airport. The command center received
information from these various agencies and then disseminated it to other agencies with little delay.

4.2.2. Technology Support for the Center of Operations
To support SARS command center's response activities, the Defense Science and Technology
Agency (DSTA) developed a crisis management system. The system provided applications to track
the movement of individuals infected with, or exposed to, SARS. The system captured data on patient
information, infection status, and relation to other patients or contacts. The information helped
generate a better understanding of the spread of infection. It allowed for the identification and
notification of potential people at risk through its linkage to the reference database. The system
required data from several agencies, including the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, the
Department of Transportation, hospitals, and hospital staff. The agencies worked independently to
gather information. For example, the Ministry of Health kept track of individuals who had been served
Home Quarantine orders. Quarantined individuals were required to appear on demand before webbased cameras plugged into telephone lines. This allowed the Ministry of Health to monitor the
patients’ compliance with the quarantine orders. DSTA attempted to add continuous improvements
and functionalities to the system that was built over the course of the first two weeks after the first
SARS case was identified. The CIO of DSTA commented: “Every night, I would go through the emails
exchanged by various heads in the government and incorporate their suggestions into the system. It
was an extremely useful communication mechanism.”

4.2.3. Communication with Stakeholders
Data from the crisis management system were used to generate reports that provided the command
center an accurate update. These updates were provided to the various agency heads, who
exchanged information, feedback, and suggestions for further actions. Thus, the crisis management
system developed to support the command center became the central tool to establish information
flow to and from various agencies. To communicate with the public, the Minister for Health would hold
a daily press conference to update the nation on SARS crisis. In communicating with the patients and
the general public, the command center relied heavily on media broadcasts. In collaboration with local
broadcasting companies, the Ministry of Health launched a free to air channel that focused
exclusively on SARS. Apart from the latest updates on SARS, it aired re-runs of programs about
SARS, related cable programs from foreign channel partners, and public education spots that gave
tips on precautions people could take against SARS. The media acted as a "mediator between the
government and the public" to keep the public informed about what the government was doing.
Furthermore, the Feedback Unit, a government agency that coordinates public feedback on
government policies and measures, gathered feedback from citizens through its online forums.
Through these manifold information gathering and dissemination actions, the SARS command center
ensured that corrective measures were openly communicated to all stakeholders. Moreover, the
command center was able to transcend the political quagmire of multiple agencies, each with a
separate agenda, creating “tele-cooperation” through the use of information technology.

4.3. Case 2: Sri Lanka Tsunami Disaster – Tzu Chi Voluntary Organization
Tzu Chi is a Taiwanese-based private, not-for-profit organization that has been involved in many
international disaster recovery operations. Known for its rapid mobilization of its volunteers during
crisis response, Tzu Chi mobilizes and coordinates volunteers arriving from the Taiwan Headquarters,
the host countries, and from neighboring countries. On December 26, 2004, an earthquake struck
under the Indian Ocean, 250 kilometers northwest of Indonesia’s Island of Sumatra and triggered a
tsunami. The tsunami devastated 13 countries’ coastlines, leaving more than 280,000 people dead
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and millions homeless. Among those countries severely affected was Sri Lanka. More than 35,000
people were killed and 443,000 people lost their homes in Sri Lanka during the tsunami disaster. The
overall damage to Sri Lanka was estimated at US $1 billion, with a large proportion of losses
concentrated in housing, tourism, fisheries, and transportation. In the aftermath of the tsunami, Tzu
Chi lent its support by collecting and assessing the ground information at Sri Lanka. Following this
initial situational assessment, Tzu Chi then developed a response plan and set up a relief
coordination center in Taiwan.
To support the extensive crisis relief activities in Sri Lanka, Tzu Chi had to raise funds. It called on
volunteers worldwide to donate and appeal for donations. Tzu Chi promoted the fundraising campaign
and broadcasted updated information about its relief missions at Sri Lanka on its television channel
“DaAi TV.” Besides television, Tzu Chi also posted daily updates on its website. According to the Sri
Lanka Tsunami Operational Director: “Many visitors visited our website and in record numbers. Some
even had trouble, for the first 2-3 days, accessing our site.” Because of its efforts to establish
transparency and accountability in managing the raised funds, Tzu Chi gained credibility from donors
and beneficiaries. According to Tzu Chi’s Secretary of Information Integration: “We had a policy of
updating our website regularly to inform donors how their donations were used, our relief activities,
and the resources used for each relief mission. By publishing the information publicly and regularly, it
helped to improve our credibility and earn the donors’ trusts.” Altogether, there were approximately
57,000 volunteers in Taiwan and 27,000 volunteers in 29 countries that helped raise funds. In Taiwan
alone, Tzu Chi raised US$14.06 million within two weeks, all of which supported the relief efforts.

4.3.1. Center of Crisis Operations
In the case of the tsunami aftermath in Sri Lanka, personnel in Tzu Chi’s headquarters scheduled and
coordinated the relief efforts on the ground at Sri Lanka. The partner organizations were dependent on
updated crisis information transmitted by Tzu Chi Headquarters. The hierarchy was relatively flat, with
headquarters’ personnel working directly with response organizations. Information coordination was
facilitated by prior relationships formed either in previous joint relief efforts or in annual social meetings.
Tzu Chi aggregated ground information provided by Tzu Chi crisis relief teams, who collated information
and needs directly from local community and government representatives. According to Tzu Chi’s
Secretary of Information Integration: “We acted very fast in gathering the ground information and
followed the news from local and international media closely. It was crucial to obtain the initial situational
information since it would determine the way we prepared for relief missions.” The updated crisis
information and the directives from headquarters helped the ground operation in many ways. According
to the commander: “It helped to ensure efficient supply of required assets to relief missions, and track
assets deployed. We also had to move the manpower and high-priority equipment quickly, and establish
forward operational storage locations to support our ground operations.”

4.3.2. Technology Support for the Center of Operations
The telephone and electronic mail were relied upon as the primary communication technologies to aid
communication between the ground operations and the headquarters. Individuals carrying out
missions on the ground provided daily information updates. Daily face-to-face meetings were
conducted to "summarize the relief activities and account for the progress." The progress was then
reported to the Tzu Chi Headquarters through fax and telephone. A large bulletin board was used on
site with detailed descriptions of daily operation updates. By consulting the headquarters, decisionmakers on the ground received alternative but feasible options for crisis response. In most
circumstances, such consultation exercises proved useful since time did not allow for the generation
of structurally different alternatives on the ground. Tzu Chi adjusted its operational plans frequently to
suit changing circumstances on the ground.

4.3.3. Communication with Stakeholders
Whereas the telephone, fax, and email were the primary communication tools to reach the response
agencies, the world-wide web was the main communication tool to reach potential donors and
volunteers. Tzu Chi had a policy of updating its website regularly. According to the Secretary of
Information Integration: “We had to inform our volunteers and donors of our relief activities, and the
resources used for the mission. By publishing the information, it helped to improve our credibility and
earn the donors’ trusts and volunteers’ continued support.”
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Overall, even though Tzu Chi deployed a less sophisticated set of communication technologies
relative to the SARS case in Singapore, it was agile in collecting data and establishing an information
flow that enhanced its speed and effectiveness in deploying its resources during disaster response.

4.4. Case 3: Hurricane Katrina - USA
On August 28, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit the southern coast of the United States with devastating
effect, resulting in some 1,800 deaths and more than US$81 billion dollars in damage. In spite of
warnings from the National Hurricane Center that Katrina was strengthening to a Category Five
storm, the highest level, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) director, Michael
Brown, did not order a mandatory evacuation. New Orlean's mayor, Ray Nagin, did declare a state of
emergency and ordered voluntary evacuation; however, the order came less than 24 hours before the
hurricane struck in the early morning hours of August 28, and many people, especially the very
vulnerable, such as those in elderly homes and hospitals, were unable to be evacuated in time.
After Hurricane Katrina struck, the city and state expected federal help in the form of troops to aid in
the rescue of survivors. However, the federal government refused to send in the troops until the state
formally requested them. The state request was delayed as a result of the state not immediately
approving the federal government’s relief plan. According to an observer: “Bureaucracy slowed the
entire relief action and initiative. For example FEMA being part of the Department of Homeland
Security became a layer down the hierarchy. All these layers further delayed clear crisis response
messages being sent out early. No layer is a good layer.”
The scenes that arguably most shocked the world took place at the Superdome and the convention
center, with thousands of people sleeping in the stadium, restroom facilities overflowing, and garbage
accumulating. Yet it turned out that neither FEMA’s director nor his boss, Homeland Security Secretary
Michael Chertoff, knew about the crisis at the convention center until four days after the hurricane had
hit Louisiana. Given that the Superdome was the designated shelter for survivors without homes, one
might presume that those leading the federal relief effort would have received information about the
squalid conditions of the shelters. But according to Chertoff, "The very day that this emerged in the
press, I was on a video conference with all the officials, including state and local officials. Strangely none
of the state and local officials told me about the convention center." Refugees from the hurricane were
eventually transferred to more viable shelters in other cities and states, but the US government endured
great criticism for its slow and seemingly disorganized response to the Katrina crisis.

4.4.1. Center of Crisis Operations
In the Katrina crisis, there was lack of clarity at the onset concerning which governing body formed
the center of the response effort. Most looked to FEMA as the center of response operations, but the
fact that FEMA was embedded within the Department of Homeland Security raised questions about
who was actually in charge of the disaster response and which department had jurisdictional
authority. In addition, being part of the massive, terrorism-focused Department of Homeland Security,
the director of FEMA, Michael Brown, confessed to having underemphasized its role in natural
disaster response.
As a result of the confusion concerning what governmental entity was supposed to be coordinating
the response effort, there were delays in information processing and transmission. The city, state, and
federal governments were not only internally slow to gather information, partly because they might
have expected someone else to be gathering the information, they were notoriously ineffective in
sharing information with other major entities. In fact, there was no central body overseeing the
sharing of information and there was confusion as to who was responsible for what.

4.4.2. Technology Support for the Center of Operations
To make matters worse, Hurricane Katrina crippled most routine telephone and cell phone
communication because of line breaks, damage to base transceiver stations, and power failures. The
damaged communication infrastructure left many key emergency response personnel with limited
means of communicating with one another. In New Orleans, hundreds of police officers were left
trying to communicate on two radio channels using a back-up system. However, the back-up system
became overwhelmed due to high volume, resulting in delays before their messages could get
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through. In addition, telephone lines experienced interruptions or were completely out of service. This
combination of overwhelmed back-up systems and interrupted phone lines obstructed the flow of
relief information (Piper & Ramos, 2006).

4.4.3. Communication with Stakeholders
Local residents as well as the larger public were highly dependent upon the media for information. But
the media could not provide the level of detail that the larger public needed: People wanted to know the
whereabouts of their family and friends who had been impacted by the hurricane, but there was no
resource to provide this information. In fact, at Red Cross shelters, individuals were registered via a
paper process, and there was no central electronic database into which the records were put (Day et al.,
2009). In part due to their inability to get relief status information from city officials, some residents took
matters into their own hands and created their own websites, providing “safe lists” of who was where,
with whom, and in what condition. The safe lists turned out to be more useful than mass media.
Overall, Hurricane Katrina turned out to be an acid test for managing information flow during crisis
response. To many, there was information chaos. Instead of a single reporting system to establish a
uniform information flow to key decision makers, the chaos appeared to be poorly mapped channels
of information flow at local, state, regional, and federal levels.

4.5. Case 4: Cyclone Nargis Crisis - Burma
In May, 2008, Cyclone Nargis hit Burma, resulting in the death of an estimated 100,000 people. In the
aftermath of the crisis, many international agencies mobilized to deliver aid to the survivors. However,
rather than allowing the foreign relief personnel immediate entry into the country, the Burmese
government -- led by a small group of military generals (the Junta) -- insisted on approving the entry
of each aid agency and all supplies. As a result, many foreign aid organizations were made to wait
anxiously for approval from the Burmese government to deliver loads of emergency supplies to the
cyclone victims. The government even labeled those providing information to the foreign media and to
Burmese media groups in exile as "saboteurs and destructive elements."
Moreover, Burma’s Foreign Ministry said it would welcome foreign aid but not foreign personnel,
providing little explanation for this stance. As a consequence, humanitarian organizations became
wary of handing over millions of dollars' worth of food and equipment to the government. As one
journalist noted, “The information blackout added a further layer of difficulty in getting an accurate
picture. The international community received restricted access to the updates in Burma and many
hundreds of thousands of Burmese and ethnic minority groups were not getting any assistance.”
Ultimately, in attempting to control the response effort in such a way as to avoid any challenge to its
own authority, the Burmese government stifled information gathering and dissemination efforts,
sabotaging well-intentioned aid agencies and denying its people much needed relief.

4.5.1. The Center of Crisis Operations
The Burmese government served as its own crisis response center in the aftermath of Cyclone
Nargis. Fearing that a free flow of information might lead to challenges to its power and authority, the
government kept tight control over information concerning the crisis. The Junta leaders minimized
information flow to foreign aid organizations. It also stymied the information flow to, and from, its own
people in order to prevent stories of slow relief and rehabilitation from reaching the foreign media.
When the international media began criticizing the Burmese government, it responded by imposing a
media ban. "The Burmese government was deeply paranoid and isolated," said Derek Mitchell,
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
"The prospect of having foreigners in the country they could not control worried them."

4.5.2. Technology Support of the Operations Center
The focus of technology by the Burmese government was less on using technology to support the
relief efforts and more on restricting the use of technology to transmit images and information about
the disaster to foreigners. As part of the overall media ban, the government cracked down on satellite
TV receivers, banned newspaper distribution, and banned the airing of TV and radio programs related
to the cyclone. According to an observer, “The government's crackdown on dealers of satellite
receivers was an attempt to impose a blackout on the media. The government had also prevented
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both foreign and domestic journalists from visiting the worst affected areas in the Irrawaddy delta.”
With the media blackout, the use of blogs and social media sites for the independent gathering and
dissemination of information began to take hold. Nevertheless, the military government made use of
its complete control over the country’s Internet gateways to partially shut down Internet access with
intermittent periods of connectivity and cut off the stream of footage and images of the cyclone’s
devastation. The military government restricted upload speeds to half the download speeds for
Internet subscribers and implemented slowdowns in Internet access speeds. It also relied on
pervasive filtering practices to shape sensitive topics and block independent media and news.

4.5.3. Communication with Stakeholders
The strict rules imposed by the Burmese government resulted in a tightly restricted flow of information
to stakeholders and a highly controlled downward chain of communication. The lack of open
communication frustrated international aid agencies and the Burmese people and certainly slowed
down the relief efforts. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon registered his “immense
frustration” with the pace of relief efforts: “I want to register my deep concern – and immense
frustration – at the unacceptably slow response to this grave humanitarian crisis. Unless more aid
gets into the country – very quickly – we face an outbreak of infectious diseases that could dwarf
today’s crisis.” Instead of focusing all its efforts on helping cyclone victims, the Burmese government’s
actions proved to be almost as destructive as the storm.

4.6. Summary
Our within-case analysis suggests that the four centers of crisis relief operations functioned very
differently, affecting the way that technology was used to coordinate information flow to and from relief
agencies, victims, and the general public. Table 5 summarizes the different approaches to information
flow revealed in the within-case analyses. Next, our cross-case analysis will compare and contrast
the four approaches to crisis response in terms of information intensity, information direction, and
information reach. In so doing, we will abstract the concepts from the within-case analysis and
develop a framework of four information network structures.
Table 5. A Summary of the Different Approaches to Information Flow Revealed in the Within
Case Analyses
Role of IT in Crisis Response
Communication across
Relief Agencies

Communication with the
Public

SARS Case

Crisis Management
Systems (CMS) to
manage flow of info from
and to agencies

Video cameras in the homes of
the quarantined and telephones

Daily press conferences,
media Broadcasts, website

Face-to-face (ground workers)

Website updates

Tsunami Case

Ground info from relief
teams sent by phone,
email and fax to the
center. Large bulletin
board used to track info.
Technology silos with little
cross-sharing of
information

Media coverage, telephone (but
highly interrupted and
overwhelmed), disaster
information and postings on
websites

Residents formed their own
"safe list" websites to update
each other on the location of
relatives

Scattered face-to-face meeting
with the authorities

Use of blogs and social media
sites for the public to share
images and information, but
these were disallowed as
soon as the government
became aware of them

Hurricane
Katrina Case

Government control over
all media with restrictions
Cyclone Nargis on what information could
Case
be transmitted
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5. Cross-case Analysis: Theoretical Synthesis
As depicted in Table 6 below, the four information network types derived from our analysis vary in the
amount of information the network is able to process (information intensity), the direction of the flow of
the information (top-down vs bottom-up), the overall reach of the information (density), and the role of
the central organizational response agency.
Table 6. The Four Crisis Response Network Structures
Information
Intensity (Amount)

Network Density
(Reach)

Direction of
Information Flow

Role of Central
Response
Organization

Information Star

High

High

Both top-down and
bottom-up

Central Information
Hub

Information Pyramid

High

Low

Top-Down

Information
Gatekeeper

Information Forest

Low

Low

In silos

There is no central
organization

Information Black-out

Low

High

Top-Down

Information Filter

The network structure used by the SARS crisis response center is based on high information flow that
reaches many stakeholders with little interference or manipulation (for political or other purposes) and
flows in multiple directions, e.g., top-down as well as bottom-up. We label this an information star
network. While there is a single focal organization at the center of the response structure, this
organization does not filter the information or manipulate the information for political or other reasons;
rather, this organization serves as a central hub and repository of information that flows to and from
response partners and stakeholders. The response partners and stakeholders are considered crisis
peers rather than subordinates.
This star network structure depends upon an emergency management IS (Hiltz et al., 2010) that is
greatly facilitated by a flexible and powerful IT infrastructure in the participating agencies (Jul, 2010)
as well as by IT know-how and resources in the responding agencies. The SARS command center
benefitted from its partnership with DSTA (Defense Science and Technology Agency), an agency that
had experience developing applications for the military, partnerships with multiple IT providers, and
strong leadership. Gathering the information was not easy, but quality information is essential to the
performance of the star network structure. The team had to identify data sources, formats, and
security issues associated with the reports contained in the crisis management system. As the CIO of
DSTA recounted, “I was told it might be impossible to gather such data, but I approached the CIOs
from various public sector agencies anyway, and they agreed to my requests."
Whereas the star network can handle large amounts of information flowing across many agencies,
the network structure used by Tzu Chi in Sri Lanka -- which we label the pyramid network -- does not
allow for as much information reach. This may largely be a result of a lack of IT skills and resources
needed to rapidly build an on-the-spot crisis management system to help manage the information
needs. The information pyramid structure characterizes a response approach built around a relatively
high information flow but relatively low density and a top-down tendency to information dissemination.
In this structure, information is gathered by the central organization (as opposed to by independent
agencies, as with the star) and sent to the supporting agencies for whom it is relevant. The pyramid
structure eliminates delays caused by bureaucratic structures (Dantas & Seville, 2006) and allows
information to be coordinated through a single body and quickly spread to others.
In the pyramid network structure, the central node controls who has access to what information.
However, this does not imply political motivations or information tampering; rather, the central node
may simply be incapable of passing along information to all the involved stakeholders in an efficient
manner and, thus, must exercise restraint. In fact, in crisis response situations involving agencies and
stakeholders who depend largely on personal information channels rather than IT-based
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communication channels, one might expect that the information pyramid is one of few viable options.
Indeed, the effectiveness of this type of network depends upon the strength of the social relationships
between the focal organization and its partners (Ghoshal et al., 1994). For example, although lacking
in IT support and skills, the Tzu Chi was able to compensate with the close ties that it had developed
with partner organizations during previous humanitarian missions. These previous joint missions
helped Tzu Chi’s relief volunteers gain an understanding of humanitarian principles and the missions
of other humanitarian agencies. As such, strong ties between Tzu Chi and its partners enabled the
pyramid structure to succeed and helped compensate for the lack of systems to help in tracking and
placement of aid supplies. This is consistent with existing literature that suggests strong ties are likely
to promote high-quality information transfer between parties and serve as effective conduits of
information (Rowley et al., 2000).
In cases of a pre-existing strong relationships, the focal organization has strong influence over its
partner organizations. Moreover, the partner organizations trust the information coming from the focal
organization. The focal organization performs the role of a central information aggregator, combining
information from its distributed partners. Unlike the information star that relies heavily upon IT to
channel information, the information pyramid network usually consists of an association of people
who share common beliefs bonded by altruism, self-interest in helping, and loyalty to an association.
The third type of information network structure we observed can be called the forest information
network. Like the pyramid, the forest has low information density, but in this case, the low density is not
because strong existing relationships enable the handling of the crisis with a lower information flow (as
in the case of the pyramid structure) but because poor existing relationships prevent high information
flow across agencies that neither know each other well nor trust each other. The Hurricane Katrina crisis
response provides an example of a forest information network. The city, state, and federal governments
can each be viewed as a separate tree in the forest. Because the agencies do not have close working
relationships, there was a tendency to put in place a tight structure in order to create a sense of order.
However, this leads to adverse effects: tight command structures only work in emergency situations
when there is a very clear, legitimate, and trusted central command organization. But because of
disagreement as to which agency should be the central command organization, no central command
organization emerges or has legitimacy. Prior studies contend that in such situations, a loosening, rather
than tightening, of the command structure is preferable (Lin et al., 2006).
In the information forest network, the structure can be seen as different entities having separate trees
of communication with little communication across the trees. Missing in the information forest is a
central organization that coordinates the flow of information throughout the response effort. The lack
of a central organization might result from ill-defined response roles, from lack of credibility in the de
facto central organization, or from disagreement about which should be the central organization. In
such a network, information flow and density, while potentially high in a given entity, remain low in the
larger network because of lack of coordination across major response entities. Disconnections
between organizations form structural holes (Ahuja, 2000): Parties on either side of a structural hole
circulate different flows of information with little or no information exchange between the two parties
(Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997). Common characteristics for this type of information network include
formal consultation, deliberation, and complex accountability procedures for information transferred
across entities. As such, organizational flexibility is compromised and crisis information is filtered
through multiple layers. Ultimately this structure incurs delays in information processing time,
information filtering, and information accessibility (Matheson & Tarjan, 1998).
The last form of information network we observed is characterized by information manipulation,
intentional blockage, and deceit. We refer to this as an information black-out network. The case of the
Cyclone Nargis crisis illustrates this type of network. The black-out information network differs from both
the information star and information pyramid networks in that the black-out has low information intensity:
Little information is gathered and even less is distributed. Moreover, the central organization serves as
an information filter -- not just deciding upon who sees what, but actively manipulating the information to
serve its purposes. Unfortunately, this central organization may not act with the interest of the major
crisis stakeholders in mind but rather acts out of concern for its own power. So while little information is
effectively gathered and much is concealed from stakeholders, the information that is shared has a wide
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reach in order to buttress the central organization's base of power. And unlike the star and pyramid
networks in which the central organization viewed the stakeholders as peers in the response, in the
black-out information network, the central organization is an authoritarian information filter to the extent
that many stakeholders are afraid to gather or share information. Consequently, information flows
between the focal and the partner organizations are minimized and, sometimes, non-existent.
While the black-out model may be adopted for political reasons, the inability for critical information to
flow between partner organizations may cause operations to fail (Matheson & Tarjan, 1998). With the
media blackout, many residents may attempt to use blogs and social media sites for information
dissemination. However, as seen in the case of Cyclone Nargis in Burma, a military government may
utilize its control over the country’s Internet gateways to disable access to the Internet or to allow only
intermittent periods of connectivity. Overall, the black-out model reduces the ability to scan the
environment for new information and may increase the uncertainty and ambiguity of major
stakeholders (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981).

6. Implications
Our research has several implications for the role of IT in crisis response. Of the four information
network structures, the star network has the greatest reach and is capable of processing the largest
amount of information. This is in large part because the star network is enabled by a central, trusted
crisis response organization and the crisis response organizers are able to rapidly improvise with IT
(Kamoche, Cunha, & Cunha, 2003). For the star information network structure to work effectively and
efficiently, the central response organizer must either have, or partner with, an agency that has a
strong IT infrastructure, strong IT development skills, and partnerships with IT vendors. This IT
agency must, in turn, be allowed to supervise all the information needs of the stakeholders involved in
crisis response. Without such centralization and organization, the star information network is likely to
degenerate into little more than un-actionable information and information overload. The finding is
consistent with Turoff et al.‘s (2009) scale of group communication commitment that calls for full-scale
collaboration on disaster management and response among crisis response organizations so as to
generate real-time, effective disaster response decisions. The network’s ability to improvise in IT
deployment hinges on its technical structure and social structure (Kamoche et al., 2003). The
technical structure refers to the knowledge, skills, and abilities related to the techno-structural aspects
of deploying IT. The social structure refers to the behavioral norms and communicative codes that
regulate coordination and collective action in a given context. The star network structure suggests
improvisation is an effective means of achieving agility in IT deployment, especially when confronted
with resource constraints or time pressures.
The role of IT in the pyramid structure is primarily for communication support among pre-existing
partners. In fact, crisis response organizers can move from a pyramid structure to a star structure by
investing time and resources in building a flexible IT infrastructure. This presupposes that the
organizers have slack time between crises and slack resources.
In the case of the forest information structure, IT is more of an inhibitor of effective crisis response
than an enabler. Because there is no trusted, central crisis response organizer (as with the star and
pyramid structures) and a lack of previous, close-working relationships among the agencies
responding (as with the pyramid structure), the different IT infrastructures of the different responding
agencies form a boundary. Current research is examining the best ways to integrate incompatible
systems during extreme events, such as a crisis (Chen, Sharman, Chakravarti, Rao, & Upadhyaya,
2008). It is possible that integration tools will be able to alleviate some of the bottlenecks implicit in
the forest structure (Chen et al., 2008). Aside from integration tools, pre-crisis simulations might help
government and humanitarian agencies learn to better coordinate.
Last, the role of IT in the black-out information structure is largely as a saboteur: Social media and
mobile technology can help disseminate information to stakeholders in spite of a central organizing
body that either is incompetent or purposely tries to withhold information. In fact, Turoff et al. (2009, p.
379) also point out that “online forums have allowed people to transcend geographical distances that
normally constrain the reach of helping efforts, to share information and coordinate citizen-led efforts.”
In this case, only the grassroots efforts of those close to the crisis could help gather and distribute
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crisis-related information. This also entails improvising with IT, but on an individual rather than
organizational level. The success of improvising with IT on an individual level, though, would depend
on creativity, personality factors, cognitive factors, domain-relevant skills, and background factors
(Magni, Proserpio, & Provera, 2006).
Our paper makes several theoretical contributions. First, there is limited research that examines
organizations’ response strategies during crises (Lin et al., 2006). This article addresses this very
important issue and contributes to the growing crisis response research. Second, we extend crisis
management research by integrating concepts from information flow and network research. Our
reviews of the theories and crisis management research suggest that a reconceptualization of crisis
management is needed from an information flows perspective (Hale et al., 2005; Majchrzak et al.,
2007). In this article, we offer a new perspective on examining how information is managed during
crisis response. The prototypes we proposed offer a starting point for developing and coordinating
different types of crisis information networks during crisis response. We believe the prototypical cases
have the potential to explain crisis response phenomenon. Third, our study helps extend the nascent
stream of research on IS in crisis response by looking at crisis response situations in which
information flowed smoothly and crisis situations in which information flow was impeded. Whereas
Day et al. (2009) identify the impediments to information flow during crisis response, our research
presents evidence that information can flow effectively given the proper information network
structures. Future research is needed to help understand why certain network structures are chosen
and whether they can be modified mid-response. Fourth, our paper provides compelling evidence of
the central role of IS resources in crisis responses. IS figure prominently as an asset (the IT
infrastructure), a capability (development skills), and a transforming activity (resolute informing).
While we concur with previous research about the important role played by IT infrastructure, IT knowhow and resources (Turoff et al., 2004; Turoff et al., 2009) and in establishing a trusting relationship
based on previous IT collaborative projects (Pan et al., 2005), our finding of the ability of response
organizations to rapidly improvise with IT that has an impact on information flow during crisis
response is refreshing and adds value to the IS literature.
Our study offers researchers a specific agenda for future research: particularly, to validate the four
crisis response network structures in other crisis response contexts. Organizational scholars could
reassess past crisis information management scenarios and try to fit the cases in one of the four
information structures. They could even consider exploring new forms of crisis information networks.
Another research direction could be to engage in a longitudinal study to understand if and how crisis
information networks evolve over time. Such investigations may allow researchers to pinpoint factors
that shape the evolution at different stages of crisis response. In this study, we emphasize the
information flows within a crisis response network. Future research could expand the levels of
analysis by including the individual level. An understanding of the communication among individuals
may offer new perspectives on crisis information network structures. Given the important role played
by IT and the time sensitive and ambiguous nature of crisis settings, possible further research hinges
on the notion of improvisation with IT that impacts the information network structure. In particular,
future research may explore how such improvisation may be conducted at both individual and
organizational levels.
While researchers theorize about crisis management, managers have a much more practical
consideration. In every crisis response situation, organizations can consider developing and
coordinating their information flows and networks based on one of the four types we proposed in this
study. Below we provide a guide (refer to Table 7) for managers who may want to set up an
information flow pattern and network for their organizations during crisis response.

7. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a framework of four crisis information networks by drawing upon social
network and information flow theories. By understanding the dynamics of information flow and
network structures, organizations can better manage information flows during crisis response. Our
findings are based upon four crisis response cases. Our analysis revealed and derived four forms of
information networks -- information star, information pyramid, information forest, and information
black-out -- with various levels of information intensity and network density. By having a sound
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information network structure (i.e., high network density and information intensity or low network
density and high information intensity), organizations can distribute efficient crisis information. Our
main contribution lies in conducting an exploratory study using an information network perspective to
examine how information flows and networks are managed during crisis response.
Table 7. A Step-by-Step Guide for Setting up Information Flow Network during Crisis
Response
Step 1: Locate Crisis Management Expertise. First step requires that managers locate the relevant crisis
management expertise. It may be someone who has at least designed a crisis management plan or was
personally involved in a crisis response operation. The person must be familiar with operating in a crisis
response context and preferably has some links to other crisis relief organizations. In other words, organizations
should identify potential leaders to lead the crisis response team.
Step 2: Make an Initial Assessment. Second step requires the organization to assess its situated network
structure. Particularly, whether the organization is a focal organization or partner organization? And which other
organizations are involved? Having established the actors, the organization should consider its levels of network
density and information intensity. A word of caution is that managers must keep a look out for changes in the
network form, since the structure may evolve as time passes. Therefore, situated assessments may have to be
performed at a later stage again.
Step 3: Understand Organizational Factors that may Affect the Network Structure. Step 3 requires that
organizations assess the organizational factors that may shape crisis information networks. Here, managers
examine whether the organization is connected to other partner organizations and if yes, to what extent? And
what is the level of inter-organizational trust established between response organizations? Does the organization
single-handedly process and control the information inflows or is there more than one information gatekeeper?
Find out whether the organization owns sufficient IT resources and capabilities. Evaluate the information
network’s IT readiness and the connectivity between organizations. If the IT readiness is high, the organization
may consider leveraging on IT to distribute crisis information. Finally, examine the relative power positions within
the network. Who has the real power? By considering the power relationships, organizations may devise an
appropriate information flow strategy taking into account the power imbalances.
Step 4: Select an Information Network Structure. This step requires organizations to select an information
network prototype suitable for them. While there may not always be a clear-cut case, organizations should select
the most probable quadrants to which they belong. Once the quadrant is established, the organization may
proceed to implement the respective information flow strategy. For example, if the information star approach is
selected, the organization should align its crisis management plan with its information systems strategy by
leveraging its advanced information infrastructure and applications to collect, process, store, and distribute crisis
information efficiently.
Step 5: Migrate the Network. Finally, the information forest and black-out organizations should consider
migrating to the quadrants of information star or information pyramid eventually if they are not already there. The
reason is that these two quadrants provide an efficient flow of crisis information. For example, if the organization
is located in the black-out quadrant and wishes to relocate, managers should identify and assess the inherent
structural holes and broker for improved relationships between organizations to establish adequate
communication links.

The results should be viewed within the context of the study’s limitations. First, of the four case data
collected in this study, two were gathered based on secondary documentation. As such, there may be
the presence of interpretation bias. While this bias may be a shortcoming in this paper, it must be
noted here that our results are in line with findings from existing crisis management studies. This
suggests the generalizability of our findings and observations to theory and their usefulness for
theory-building. Furthermore, to substantiate the reasons why more crisis response cases were not
studied, it is generally known that crisis situations may involve loss of lives and valuables, and are
sensitive topics, making it difficult for researchers to obtain case access. Second, it should be noted
that Tzu Chi’s efforts in response to the Sri Lanka Tsunami crisis might have been affected by the fact
that it was not central to the network of agencies coordinated by the Sri Lankan government, unlike
our other three cases, which all reflected responses by the governments of the countries affected.
Despite the limitations, we believe our study will appeal to organizations in both the public and private
sectors that are directly involved in handling emergency situations. By understanding how information
flows may be best managed during crisis response and how information systems can enable or
constrain information network structures, crisis-response organizations will be better able to manage
the flow of crisis information.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Excerpts of Interview Topic Guides
Case of SARS Crisis
• Organizational and departmental characteristics (e.g. number of people, number of departments
and formal organizations).
• Describe the crisis management protocols and practices in the government agencies.
• Please provide the background information of the crisis response efforts (who initiated the
response, its objective, who was involved, the response scope?).
• How did you identify your stakeholders? Understand stakeholders’ varying perceptions toward the
crisis response. Identify the differences in the opinion towards crisis response.
• Did the response teams have adequate access to organizational resources? What resources were
provided? How were existing resources deployed to support this? Were there new resources
deployed?
• How were crisis response groups organized? How group members were selected?
• Did the agencies develop any capabilities from utilizing the resources? Were the capabilities and
resources leveraged to fulfill the objective of crisis response?
• When handling crisis response initiative, how were processes, personnel deployment and rescue
services formulated? How did the response agencies acquire related crisis response knowledge?
Was information technology leveraged? What role did the information technology play in crisis
response? How did the response agencies win stakeholders’ trust?
• What factors were taken into consideration when selecting various information technology
applications and tools? What were the challenges faced during system set up and deployment?
How was coordination with software vendors and users achieved in terms of communication and
the understanding of requirements and system compatibility?
• How did Singapore handle and respond to any extraordinary and unexpected situations that
caused disruptions to crisis response? What were the challenges faced when integrating various
information systems?
• During crisis response, which portion did you consider to be the most difficult? How were the
problems resolved? During initial phase of crisis response, did the coordination proceed well? How
were problems resolved?
• How did the agencies store and transfer crisis related information during crisis response? Were the
information collection, exchange and processing processes effective?
• How did the agencies store and transfer any knowledge created during crisis response?
• How were the relationships between the agencies, and between the agencies and other NGOs?
How did they cooperate with one another in the crisis relief activities?

Case of Tzu Chi
• Have you ever joined any overseas relief project? Which is most impressive one to you and why?
• What do you think are the main reasons that Tzu Chi has been participating in overseas relief
actively since 1990?
• Does Tzu Chi have overseas relief manuals?
• How does Tzu Chi establish relationship with overseas countries? How does Tzu Chi gain local
trust? How does Tzu Chi respond to local government?
• What are the relationships between Tzu Chi and other Non-governmental organizations?
• What is the level of corporation in international relief activities?
• Have you participated in the Sri Lanka Tsunami Relief Project? What were your responsibilities
(i.e., domestic affairs, overseas affairs, logistics, and ground force)?
• How to exchange information between ground team and Taiwan Headquarters?
• Was Tzu Chi effective in information collection, exchange and processing? Why?
• How did Tzu Chi train the relief project group members?
• How to select personnel to join the relief project group? How to select the leader
• How was Tzu Chi able to react to disaster so quickly?
• What were the areas for improvement in the Sri Lanka Relief Project?
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Appendix B. Excerpts of Data Sources related to Hurricane Katrina Crisis
Response
Government Websites
US Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
http://www.FEMA.gov/.
Ready. http://www.ready.gov/.
US Department of Health and Human Services.
http://www.hhs.gov/disasters/emergency/naturaldisasters/hurricanes/katrina/index.html.
Hurricane Katrina.com. http://www.hurricanekatrina.com/.
US Government. http://www.usa.gov/Citizen/Topics/PublicSafety/Hurricane_Katrina_Recovery.shtml.

News Reports
Laforet, L. (2010, August 25). Hurricane Katrina. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/h/hurricane_katrina/index.html.
Special Report (2005, August 29). Voices from the Gulf Coast. CNN. Retrieved from
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2005/katrina/.
Special Report (2007, August 29). The Guardian. Hurricane Katrina. Guardian. Retrieved from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/katrina/0,,1560620,00.html.
Special Report (2005, September 9). ABC News. Katrina Recovery Effort Delayed, may Hinder
Identification Process. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/HurricaneKatrina/.

Journal Articles
Hurley-Hanson, A. (2006). Organizational responses and adaptations after 9-11. Management
Research News, 29(8), 480-494.
Schneider, S. (2005). Administrative breakdowns in the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina.
Public Administration Review, 65(5), 515-516.
Palen, L., Hiltz, R., & Liu, S. (2007). Online forums supporting grassroots participation in emergency
preparedness and response. Communications of the ACM, 50(3), 54-58.
Rodriguez, H., Trainor, J., & Quarantelli, E. (2006). Rising to the challenges of a catastrophe: The
emergent and prosocial behavior following Hurricane Katrina. The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 604(1), 82-101.
Boin, A., & McConnell, A. (2007). Preparing for critical infrastructure breakdowns: The limits of crisis
management and the need for resilience. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management
15(1), 50-59.
Kates, R., Colten, C., Laska, S., & Leatherman, S. (2006). Reconstruction of New Orleans after
Hurricane Katrina: A research perspective. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
of the United States of America, 103(40), 14653-14660.
Mehrotra, S., Znati, T., & Thompson, C. (2008). Crisis management. IEEE Internet Computing, 12(1),
14-17.
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Appendix C. Excerpts of Data Sources related to Cyclone Nagis Crisis
Response
Institution Websites
Special Report (2008, May 8) Myanmar: Tropical Cyclone Nargis. ReliefWeb. Retrieved from
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc108?OpenForm&emid=TC-2008-000057-MMR&rc=3.
Special Report (2008, May 8) After Cyclone Nargis, Burmese Junta blocked the aids, while more
people are dying. Workpress.com. Retrieved from
http://sitmone.wordpress.com/2008/05/08/day-5-after-cyclone-nargis-burmese-junta-blocked-the-aidswhile-more-people-are-dying/.

News Reports
Special Report (2008, May 6). Govt. Keeps Cyclone Relief Workers From Entering Country. ABC
News. Retrieved from http://abcnews.go.com/.
Albright, M. (2008, June 11). The End of Intervention.
http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/prod_images/pdfs/AlbrightMadeleine.TheEndOfIntervention.6.12
.2008.pdf.
Special Report (2008, May 6). Cyclone Devastates Burma. Australian Broadcasting Corporation.
Special Report (2008, May 11). Extra aid bound for cyclone Nagis survivors in Burma. CourierMail.
Retrieved from http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,23680445-953,00.html.
Special Report (2008, May 14). Authorities restrict Cyclone Nargis news coverage. CPJ.org.
Retrieved from http://cpj.org/2008/05/authorities-restrict-cyclone-nargis-news-coverage.php.
Special Report (2009, November 4). Cyclone Nargis. New York Times. Retrieved from
http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/international/countriesandterritories/myanmar/cyclone_nargis/in
dex.html.
Special Report (2008, May 12). Response to Cyclone in Myanmar ‘unacceptably slow’ – Ban Kimoon. UN News Center. Retrieved from
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26634&Cr=myanmar&Cr1.

Journal Articles
Barber, R. (2009). The responsibility to protect the survivors of natural disaster: Cyclone Nargis, a
case study. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 14(1), 3-34.
Oloruntoba, R., & Gray, R. (2009). Customer service in emergency relief chains. International Journal
of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 39(6), 486-505.
Selth, A. (2008). Even paranoids have enemies: Cyclone Nargis and Myanmar's fears of invasion.
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 30(3), 379402.
Stover, E., & Vinck, P. (2008). Cyclone Nargis and the politics of relief and reconstruction aid in
Myanmar. Journal of American Medical Association, 300(6), 729-731.
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